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Construction Law
by Frank 0. Brown, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article focuses on noteworthy opinions by Georgia appellate
courts between June 1, 2016 and May 31, 2017 that are relevant to the
practice of construction law.1
II. MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN's LIENS

A. Period for Foreclosure
In Lang v. Brand-VaughanLumber Co., 2 the Georgia Court of Appeals
addressed whether a lien claimant could foreclose on a mechanics' and
materialmen's lien more than seven years after the judgment the lien
claimant obtained on the underlying judgment for the debt. 3 The court
held that it could not because, under Georgia's dormant judgment
statute, 4 the judgment was no longer valid.5 Not directly addressed by
the court was whether the result would have been different if the
judgment had been renewed or revived per Georgia law. 6
B. Notice of Commencement of Project
To perfect a mechanics' and materialmen's lien, a person providing
labor, services, or materials for the improvement of property, and who
has a right to a lien but does not have privity of contract with the

*Shareholder in the firm of Weissman, Nowack, Curry & Wilco, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia.
General Counsel for Greater Atlanta Home Builders Association, Inc. Rhodes College (B.A.,
1976); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 1979). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of construction law during the prior survey period, see Frank 0.
Brown, Jr., ConstructionLaw, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 68 MERCERL. REV. 83 (2016).
2. 339 Ga. App. 710, 792 S.E.2d 461 (2016).
3. Id. at 711, 792 S.E.2d at 463.
4. O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60(a) (2017).
5. Lang, 339 Ga. App. at 714-15, 792 S.E.2d at 465.
6. See generally id. at 710, 792 S.E.2d at 461.
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contractor, is required by section 44-14-361.5(a) 7 of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) to give a written "notice to contractor" with
information set forth in O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(c).8 The information must
be provided within thirty days from the date that the owner, agent for
owner, or contractor files a notice of commencement per O.C.G.A.
§ 44-14-361.5(b),9 or thirty days following the first delivery of the labor,
services, or materials to the property, whichever is later.10 The purpose
of the notice to contractor is to alert the contractor and owner that a
person not in privity with the contractor has lien rights relating to the
property so that care can be taken by the contractor and owner to make
sure that person is paid. However, under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(d),11 a
notice to contractor is not required if the owner, agent for owner, or
contractor fails to file the project notice of commencement. 12
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(b) lists the information to be included in a
project notice of commencement.1 3 Several prior Georgia Court of Appeals
opinions have addressed, with mixed results, whether a failure to provide
all of that information, or to otherwise strictly comply with project notice
of commencement requirements, is fatal to the effectiveness of that
notice. 14 Capitol Materials, Inc. v. JLB Buckhead, LLC 15 once again dealt
with that question. There, Capitol Materials, Inc., a supplier to a
subcontractor, contended that it was excused from timely giving a notice
to contractor because the subject project notice of commencement
allegedly did not include several statutorily required items of
information.16 The Georgia Court of Appeals did not analyze compliance
with each of those items, but determined that the failure of the project
notice of commencement to identify or provide contact information for the
owner's
construction
lender,
as
required
by
O.C.G.A.
7. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(a) (2017).
8. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(c) (2017).
9. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(b) (2017).
10. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(a). The notice of commencement of the project per O.C.G.A.
§ 44-14-361.5(b) is different from the notice of commencement of a lien action under
O.C.G.A. § 4 4-14-361.1(a)(3). See O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(b).
11. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(d) (2017).
12. Id.
13. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(b).
14. See generally Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Lafarge Bldg. Materials, Inc., 312
Ga. App. 821, 720 S.E.2d 288 (2011); Se. Culvert, Inc. v. Hardin Bros., LLC, 312 Ga. App.
158, 718 S.E.2d 28 (2011); Beacon Med. Prods., LLC v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 292 Ga.
App. 617, 665 S.E.2d 710 (2008); Harris Ventures, Inc. v. Mallory & Evans, Inc., 291 Ga.
App. 843, 662 S.E.2d 874 (2008); Gen. Elec. Co. v. N. Point Ministries, Inc., 289 Ga. App.
382, 657 S.E.2d 297 (2008).
15. 337 Ga. App. 848, 789 S.E.2d 803 (2016).
16. Id. at 850, 789 S.E.2d at 805.
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§ 44-14-361.5(b)(6),17 was alone sufficient to render the project notice of
commencement fatally defective.1 8 Consequently, the supplier was not
required to provide a notice to the contractor as a condition to the
effectiveness of its lien, meaning that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to the owner on the supplier's in rem claim lien
against the subject property.19
III. MOLD
Construction lawyers often encounter mold claims. In Barko Response
Team, Inc. v. Sudduth,20 a homeowner sued his homeowner's insurer and
a mold remediation company alleging, in part, that the company was
negligent in its mold remediation services and that he was injured by
mold exposure. The company moved for summary judgment, contending
that there was no evidence that the alleged negligence caused the
homeowner's illness. The trial court denied that motion. 21
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals noted that the Georgia
Supreme Court recently explained, in Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v.
Knight,22 that an expert's opinion on causation in a toxic tort case, which
includes a mold claim, is admissible only if the expert concludes that the
plaintiffs exposure to a toxic substance made at least a "meaningful
contribution" to his injuries. 23 The Georgia Court of Appeals concluded
that the affidavit and letter from the plaintiffs physician expert failed to
meet that standard because it did not give any opinion on the degree to
which the homeowner's exposure to mold contributed to his injuries, the
basis for his understanding that there were high levels of toxic mold in
the home, or the factual basis for his opinion that the mold caused the
homeowner's illnesses. 24 The court also concluded that the gap left by the
medical testimony was not cured, as is sometimes the case, by non-expert
testimony of a causal link between the alleged negligence and the
plaintiffs alleged injuries. 25 Thus, the trial court erred in denying
26
summary judgment.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(b)(6) (2017).
Capitol Materials, 337 Ga. App. at 852, 789 S.E.2d at 806.
Id.
339 Ga. App. 897, 795 S.E.2d 198 (2016).
Id. at 897, 795 S.E.2d at 199.
299 Ga. 286, 788 S.E.2d 421 (2016).
Barko, 339 Ga. App. at 900, 795 S.E.2d at 201.
Id. at 900-01, 795 S.E.2d at 201.
Id. at 901, 795 S.E.2d at 202.
Id. at 902, 795 S.E.2d at 202.
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IV. UNLICENSED CONTRACTORS

.

Construction lawyers need to be mindful of contractor licensing issues
because they can have a profound impact on the rights of parties in a
construction project. Section 43-41-17(b) 27 of the O.C.G.A. states in
relevant part that:
As a matter of public policy, any contract entered into on or after
July 1, 2008, for the performance of work for which a residential
contractor or general contractor license is required by this chapter and
not otherwise exempted under this chapter 28 and which is between an
owner and a contractor who does not have a valid and current license
required for such work in accordance with this chapter shall be
unenforceable in law or in equity by the unlicensed contractor . . .
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, if a contract
is rendered unenforceable under this subsection, no lien or bond claim
shall exist in favor of the unlicensed contractor for any labor, services, or
materials provided under the contract or any amendment thereto. This
subsection shall not affect the rights of parties other than the unlicensed
contractor to enforce contract, lien, or bond remedies. 29
A key issue in Ussery v. Goodrich Restoration, Inc., 30 was whether,
under the facts of this case, O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(b) authorizes a
homeowner to recover funds that he paid to an unlicensed restoration
company. 31 In addressing that question, the Georgia Court of Appeals
first noted that there is no authority applying O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(b) to
a claim for return of funds from an unlicensed contractor. 32 The court
then noted that, by its terms, O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(b) does not expressly
authorize such a claim. 33
The court then turned to the specific facts of the case, which included
that the unlicensed contractor had paid all funds received from the
homeowner to subcontractors who had performed the restoration work,
the unlicensed contractor had made no profit on the project, and the
homeowner had not claimed any damages as a result of the work
performed by the contractor and its subcontractors. 34 Based on these
facts, the court held that the trial court had properly entered judgment

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(b) (2017).
See O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17 for exemptions.
O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(b).
341 Ga. App. 390, 800 S.E.2d 606 (2017).
Id. at 391, 800 S.E.2d at 608.
Id. at 392, 800 S.E.2d at 609.
Id.
Id. at 392-93, 800 S.E.2d at 609.
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in favor of the contractor on the refund claim following a bench trial on
that and other claims.

35

V. APPORTIONMENT
Construction lawyers should be familiar with Georgia's apportionment
statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33,36 because it may substantially impact the
amount of recoverable damages. Although not a construction case,

Camelot

Club

Condominium Ass'n

v.

Afari-Opoku 37 addresses

apportionment issues that might be relevant in some constructionrelated disputes.
In Camelot, the spouse of a murdered resident of a condominium
complex brought action against the complex and a security firm alleging
negligence and nuisance. The jury apportioned 25% fault to the complex
and 25% to the security firm. The trial court thereafter entered a
judgment that imposed liability on the complex for the security firm's
25% fault. 38
The complex appealed, arguing the trial court erred in doing so.
Because the complex was vicariously liable for the security firm's actions
under either O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(4)39 or O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(5),40 the plaintiff
argued that the assignment of the security firm's fault to the complex
was proper. 41 The former 'statute imposes liability on an employer for an
independent contractor's performance in connection with a statutory
duty, such as the duty under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-142 to keep premises safe. 43
The latter imposes liability on an employee who maintains control over
an independent contractor. 44
The Georgia Court of Appeals first noted that O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33
generally precludes any post-verdict reassignment of damages based on
a jury's apportionment of fault. 45 Signaling that a post-verdict
reassignment might sometimes be proper, the court nevertheless
addressed the plaintiffs contention that a post-verdict reassignment was

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 394, 800 S.E.2d at 610.
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 (2017).
340 Ga. App. 618, 798 S.E.2d 241 (2017).
Id. at 618, 798 S.E.2d at 244. The security firm also remained liable for its 25%. Id.
O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(4) (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(5) (2017).
Camelot Club, 340 Ga. App. at 624, 798 S.E.2d at 247-48.
O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 (2017).
Camelot Club, 340 Ga. App. at 624, 798 S.E.2d at 248.
Id.
Id. at 626, 798 S.E.2d at 248-49.
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necessary because apportionment under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 does not
apply to vicarious liability. 46
The court ultimately determined that it could not tell from the jury's
general verdict whether it was based on vicarious liability and that the
trial court therefore erred in reassigning liability to the complex.4 7 The
court noted that the jury might have found the complex liable for
nuisance without regard to any actions by the security firm, in which case
vicarious liability would not arise. 48 It also noted that the jury might also
have imposed liability on the security firm based on its independent
common law duty to provide security. 49 In other words, in the absence of
a special verdict, special interrogatories, or pretrial clarification, an
independent claim against either the employer or the independent
contractor can possibly result in the inapplicability of the general rule
that apportionment does not apply to vicarious liability.5o
VI. ECONOMIC-Loss RULE
The economic-loss rule is frequently mentioned in construction-related
disputes. In Atlantic Geoscience, Inc. v. Phoenix Development & Land,5 1
that rule was an issue in the context of the purchase and development of
real property. 52 Developer Phoenix hired engineering firm Atlantic to
perform a Phase I Environmental Assessment of about forty-five acres of
land that Phoenix was considering buying. Atlantic's written report to
Phoenix stated that a small part of the property was a soil/stone storage
yard. After buying the property in partial reliance on that statement,
Phoenix sold the forty-five acres to a related entity for development.
Phoenix and that entity then learned that the small portion of land was
actually a landfill and that the property could not be developed as
planned. Ultimately, the forty-five acres was re-conveyed to Phoenix and
its lender foreclosed on that acreage.5 3
Phoenix then sued Atlantic for professional negligence. The trial court
granted summary judgment to Atlantic finding that the damages sought
by Phoenix were barred by the economic-loss rule and that Phoenix had

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 629, 798 S.E.2d at 250.
Id. at 628, 798 S.E.2d at 250.
Id.
See generally id. at 618, 798 S.E.2d at 241.

51. 341 Ga. App. 81, 799 S.E.2d 242 (2017).
52. Id. at 84, 799 S.E.2d at 245.
53. Id. at 83, 799 S.E.2d at 244-45.
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presented no evidence that its damages were proximately caused by
Atlantic's negligence. 54
In reversing the trial court, the Georgia Court of Appeals first
explained that the economic-loss rule generally provides that a
contracting party who suffers purely economic loss (as opposed to damage
to property or person) must seek a remedy in contract, not in tort.55 The
court then noted that Georgia law permits the recovery of certain types
of economic losses where the plaintiff alleges a professional negligent
misrepresentation.5 6 Specifically, the court stated that Phoenix may
recover those damages necessary to compensate [it] for the pecuniary loss
to [it] of which the misrepresentation is a legal cause, including (a) The
difference between the value of what [Phoenix] has received in the
transaction and its purchase price or other value given for it; and (b)
Pecuniary loss suffered otherwise as a consequence of [its] reliance upon
the representation.5 7
The court concluded that most of the damages sought by Phoenix could
not be recovered under this exception.5 8 For example, the damages
Phoenix sought under a "benefit-of-the-bargain" standard for the
amounts that it hoped to achieve when it bought the forty-five acres in
reliance on Atlantic's statement cannot be recovered.59 However, under
the exception, it might recover pre-development out-of-pocket
expenditures made in reliance on that statement.60
VII. O.C.G.A.

§ 9-11-9.1 AFFIDAVIT

Petree v. Georgia Department of Transportation1 is a reminder that,
under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1,62 there is an important limitation on the

affidavit requirement. 63 Petree sued the Georgia Department of
Transportation and Macon-Bibb County alleging, in part, that the
defendants had negligently planned, designed, constructed, and
maintained a drainage ditch, resulting in flooding to her property. The

54. Id. 83-84, 799 S.E.2d at 245.
55. Id. at 84, 799 S.E.2d at 245.
56. Id. The court also noted that the affidavit required by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 applies
to these claims and that they can be made against one in contractual privity with the
plaintiff. 341 Ga. App. at 85, 799 S.E.2d at 246.
57. 341 Ga. App. at 85, 799 S.E.2d at 246.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 85-85, 799 S.E.2d at 246.
60. Id. at 85-86, 799 S.E.2d at 246.
61. 340 Ga. App. 694, 798 S.E.2d 482 (2017).
62. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (2017).
63. See generally Petree, 340 Ga. App. at 694, 798 S.E.2d at 482.
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defendants moved to dismiss the complaint in part because it was not
supported by an expert affidavit under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1. The trial
court granted that motion. 64
On appeal, Petree did not challenge the ruling as to her claims for
negligent planning, design, and construction. She did, however, argue
that an expert affidavit was not required to support her claim for
ordinary negligent maintenance of the ditch.65 The Georgia Court of
Appeals agreed, and reversed the dismissal as to that claim.6 6

VIII.

HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE

In Clary v. Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.,67 the homeowner's
policy allowed Allstate to elect to either repair a fire loss or pay the
homeowners for that loss. Allstate first elected to repair the damage, but
after a dispute arose with the homeowners during that work, it elected
to pay the loss. The homeowners filed suit contending, in part, that
Allstate could not change its mind and that, among other alleged wrongs,
it breached the policy by doing so. Concluding that Allstate was not
precluded from changing its mind, the trial court entered summary
judgment on that claim.6 8 The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed that
order.69
IX. STORMWATER RUNOFF

Stormwater runoff claims frequently arise in connection with new
construction or additions to existing buildings. In Terry v. Catherall,70
the principle issue was whether, in response to the defendants' motions
for summary judgment on the plaintiff homeowners' nuisance claim, the
plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence that the defendants had
"caused an increase in the volume and velocity of water flowing onto the
plaintiffs' property."7 1 The trial court concluded that the plaintiffs had

64. Id. at 695-96, 798 S.E.2d at 486.
65. Id. at 700, 798 S.E.2d at 489.
66. Id. at 701, 798 S.E.2d at 489-90.
67. 340 Ga. App. 351, 795 S.E.2d 757 (2017).
68. Id. at 351-54, 795 S.E.2d at 759-61.
69. Id. at 355, 795 S.E.2d at 762. On another point, it is noteworthy that the court also
stated that, "even when an insurer restores damaged real property to its pre-loss condition,
it may also be liable to pay for any post-repair diminution in value." Id. at 355, 795 S.E.2d
at 761-62. The court cited Royal CapitalDevelopment LLC v. Maryland Casualty Co., 291
Ga. 262, 265, 728 S.E.2d 234, 237 (2012), in support of that statement. Clary, 340 Ga. App.
at 355, 795 S.E.2d at 761-62.
70. 337 Ga. App. 902, 789 S.E.2d 218 (2016).
71. Id. at 904, 789 S.E.2d at 221.
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not because, even though their expert had provided calculations that the
defendants had greatly increased the impervious surfaces of their
properties, he had not conducted any tests to measure the velocity of
water runoff from the defendants' property, the volume of water flowing
onto the plaintiffs' property, or the slope of the defendants' property.
Thus, the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs' expert had speculated
that the increase in impervious surface had caused an increase in water
flow onto the plaintiffs' property. 72
The Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed, and reversed and remanded
the case to the trial court. 73 It noted that the defendants had not
challenged the admissibility of the plaintiffs' expert testimony but,
rather, had asserted that it was insufficient to create a genuine issue on
causation. 74 The court concluded that the plaintiffs' expert testimony that
the greatly increased impervious surfaces on the defendants' property
had increased the volume and velocity of water flowing onto the plaintiffs'
property and was sufficient to defeat the motions for summary
judgment. 75
X. ARBITRATION

Many, if not most, construction contracts have arbitration provisions.
In a case of first impression, the Georgia Court of Appeals, in Suntrust
Bank v. Lilliston,76 addressed whether in the context of a renewal action
by the plaintiff debtor against Suntrust, the latter could compel
arbitration per the parties' agreement even though Suntrust had not
demanded arbitration in the original action, but had litigated the case for
over twenty-one months during which time it engaged in discovery and
filed a motion for summary judgment.7 7 The trial court denied Suntrust's
motion to compel arbitration, and concluded that it had waived the right
to demand arbitration.78
On appeal, Suntrust argued that the trial court erred because, under
established Georgia appellate authority, a defendant in a renewal action
can raise a defense not raised in the original action. 7 The Georgia Court

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
S.E.2d
(1991);

Id.
Id. at 906, 789 S.E.2d at 222.
Id. at 905, 789 S.E.2d at 222.
Id. at 906, 789 S.E.2d at 221-22.
338 Ga. App. 738, 791 S.E.2d 614 (2016).
Id. at 741, 791 S.E.2d at 617.
Id. at 739, 791 S.E.2d at 616.
Id. at 741, 791 S.E.2d at 617; see also Adams v. Gluckman, 183 Ga. App. 666, 359
710 (1987); Fine v. Higgins Foundry & Supply Co., 201 Ga. App. 275, 410 S.E.2d 821
Hornsby v. Hancock, 165 Ga. App. 543, 301 S.E.2d 900 (1983).
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of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Suntrust's motion to compel
arbitration, and reasoned that Suntrust was not precluded from raising
arbitration in the renewal action simply because it had failed to do so in
the original action. Instead, Suntrust was precluded from doing so
because, according to the trial court's findings, Suntrust had acted
inconsistently with its arbitration right in the original action and, in so
doing, had prejudiced the plaintiff. The court of appeals reasoned that it
could not overturn the trial court's findings because they were not clearly
erroneous.8 0

80. Suntrust Bank, 338 Ga. App. at 741-42, 791 S.E.2d at 617-18.

